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Closed-Circuit Television Testimony:
Liveness and Truth-telling
Kathryn Leader
A witness who gives evidence orally demonstrates, for good or ill,
more about his or her credibility than a witness whose evidence is
given in documentary form. Oral evidence is public; written evidence
may not be. Oral evidence gives to the trial the atmosphere which,
though intangible, is often critical to the jury’s estimate of the witness.
Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987)
The legal arena may be one of the few remaining cultural contexts in
which live performance is still considered essential (Auslander 1999: 9).

Introduction
The live presence of all trial participants in a shared space is a
longstanding feature of the adversarial criminal jury trial. Along
with this practice is the equally longstanding belief that live presence
facilitates truth-seeking. Going back as far as the trials by ordeal where
a witness’s body was actually ‘read’ to reveal the truth, live presence
has been believed, in various ways, to make the criminal trial safer
and fairer. These ideas currently most commonly revolve around
the concepts of demeanour and confrontation, where the participants’
presence and their interaction will help indicate to the jury the truth
of the matter. These beliefs are, however, largely implicit, contradictory
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and generally vague: how and why it may be valuable has not been
clearly articulated until recently. The advent of mediatised technology
into the courtroom in the 20th century led to a renewed attempt to
account for the value of live performance.

In this paper, I examine how arguments about the value of live
performance (whether or not the term ‘performance’ is actually
invoked) have been pivotal in debates about the use of closed-circuit
television testimony (CCTV). I begin by defining CCTV testimony
and examining its current use in courtrooms as a means of mediation
for a ‘vulnerable witness’; that is, a witness who, in the view of the
court, would be likely to find traditional modes of delivering testimony
overly traumatic in legal opinion for a variety of reasons. I argue that
the introduction of CCTV testimony has posed a challenge to deepseated beliefs about the link between live presence and truth-telling
because it is able to leave undisturbed, or replicate, all aspects of the
fair trial (including the need for it to be open) with the sole exception of
the absence of a witness’s body from the courtroom. This has provoked
legal debate as to what is at stake in the live presence of bodies together
in the same place.

Drawing on the work of performance theorist Philip Auslander
(1987, 1999), I will analyse the extent to which CCTV testimony debate
bears out Auslander’s claim regarding the ‘essential’ role of liveness
in the legal arena. As I will show, the legal emphasis on empirical
evidence to define the ‘essential’ role of live presence in various studies
is problematic as it overlooks the importance of belief. I conclude that
it is the beliefs concerning live presence that sustain the routine use of
coercion in the trial and, ultimately, pose a potential stumbling block
to the use of mediatised technology in the courtroom.

Methodology and Terminology
The focus of this paper is to examine debate about CCTV testimony
to illuminate the central role of live performance in the trial and
the potential consequences this may have for mediatisation in the
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courtroom. As I note in my introduction, the most obvious difference
between the use of CCTV testimony and evidence testing in a
traditional trial is the absence of a witness’s body from the courtroom.
It is my contention that this ‘absence’ of the body has focused legal
attention on the value of ‘presence’. However, when a witness is absent
from the courtroom they are still ‘present’ somewhere; it is simply that
this is not in the courtroom. Consequently, the importance of what
happens in the courtroom is as fundamental as what is happening at
the remote site.1

The metaphor of the trial as theatre or performance is pervasive.
Closer examination reveals that the metaphor involves more than an
acknowledgment of shared features. In fact, more commonly, the
more ‘theatrical’ a trial is deemed to be, the more it is believed to
have strayed from some implicit belief of what it is meant to be or do.
This attitude is in keeping with Elizabeth Burns’ (1973) argument
that a pejorative conception of ‘theatricality’ can only exist if there
is an implicit dichotomy being made between natural and theatrical
behaviour, for example, the trial is about truth-telling and high stakes,
and the theatre is about artifice and entertainment. In other words, the
theatre is about ‘performing’, and the trial is about ‘not-performing’ or
behaving naturally.
Burns argues that the ‘theatrical’ is not a series of specific definable
signs, but rather the ‘double relationship between the theatre and social
life’. For Burns (1973), theatrical practice is ‘both formed by and helps to
re-form and so conserve or change the values and norms of the society
which supports it’. Theatre can therefore be conservative or transgressive
but, in a relatively dialogic relationship, it both affects and is affected by
society‘s collective consciousness. Following Burns, I argue that outside
the discursive space of the theatre, behaviour that is a transgression
of or deviation from convention — that stands out — is regarded as
‘theatrical’ or performative. While, the trial may seem ‘theatrical’ for
laypersons because of shared conventions such as costume and staging,
for legal practitioners the ‘theatrical’ is behaviour that deviates from
habituated courtroom practice, for example, when a defendant ‘acts up’
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as opposed to behaving appropriately or naturally (‘not-performing’).
This means that legal practitioners will not necessarily recognise ‘normal’
courtroom behaviour as involving ‘performance’:
Behaviour is not [therefore] theatrical because it is of a certain kind
but because the observer recognises certain patterns and sequences
which are analogous to those with which he [or she] is familiar in the
theatre. What anyone chooses to classify as performative involves a
particular form of recognition’ (Burns 1973: 3-4).

It is the mode of reception that determines and therefore shapes
the construction of an event as performative. Consequently in this
paper I will investigate legal discussion and debate about the value
of live presence or orality when we reconfigure this language into the
language of performance. Rather than seeing the role of performance
in the trial as a form of embellishment (or a form of deviance), I
argue that performance plays a constitutive role in the adversarial
criminal jury trial. As I will outline, failure to recognise the crucial
role of performance has potential consequences for the use of CCTV
testimony.

The Live Trial
Justice Underwood (2006), of the New South Wales (NSW) Supreme
Court, argues that the live trial, where all participants must gather in
the same place at the same time, is an outdated, costly and unnecessary
historical inheritance (Underwood 2006: 166)2. Further, the emphasis
on orality ought to be set aside as, historically, this was primarily for the
benefit of an illiterate jury and is now outmoded. It would be far better,
Underwood argues, to use depositions more freely as this would allow
faster, cheaper disputes resolution. Yet, despite Underwood’s criticism
of the live adversarial trial, he makes it quite clear he is talking about
non-criminal matters only. Underwood does not claim that this action
would be appropriate in the criminal trial and does explain his reasons
for this distinction.
Underwood’s paper thus points to a longstanding belief among legal
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practitioners and laypersons that participants sharing the same space at
the same time facilitate access to the truth and make the criminal trial
safer. Yet the statutory evidence for this belief is available by implication
only in Australia, with the value of live presence being inferred from
the rules regarding depositions in place of witnesses in criminal and
non-criminal matters. In non-criminal cases, a witness can submit a
deposition in lieu of attending the courtroom if the distance they would
have to travel would cause ‘undue’ difficulties in Australia. However, in
criminal trials the only justification for non-attendance of a witness is
if they are either dead or dying (Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW):
ss 284-285). No explanation is given for this distinction between
non-criminal and criminal process.3 However, the NSW Law Reform
Commission (1978), when investigating the rule against hearsay, specify
that any discrepancy between criminal and non-criminal proceedings
can be attributed to the need for a higher standard of proof in the
criminal trial (NSW Law Reform Commission 1978: Chapter 6).4
A witness’s presence in the courtroom, then, is seen as essential in
facilitating a fair outcome in an adversarial criminal trial.5

CCTV testimony is used when the judge has decided (on evidence
argued by the prosecution, excepting the rare jurisdictions where it is
assumed) that the presence of trial participants together in the same
room may present impediments to a fair outcome. These impediments
most often concern the concept of the ‘vulnerable witness’. The
vulnerable witness is a person deemed by the court as one who would
be likely to find the space of the courtroom potentially traumatic
to the extent that it would adversely affect his or her ability to give
evidence. The most common usage of CCTV testimony occurs in
Family Courts, and most rules regarding vulnerable witnesses extend
from circumstances where children are witnesses.
The potential trauma of being in the courtroom is legally defined
as the stress a complainant may experience when he or she has to share
the same space as his/her alleged attacker. There is also the possibility
of deliberate intimidation of a witness by the accused (ALRC 1997:
14.102). Another acknowledged source of stress is ‘the trauma of a

316

CCTV: Liveness and Truth-telling

courtroom appearance’ (NSWLRC 1994: 7.29). CCTV testimony is
therefore posited as a way in which vulnerable witnesses are still able
to give evidence cogently, without threat and the concomitant stress
that may affect their testimony adversely.
Legal professor Louise Ellison points out: ‘This represents a critical
acceptance that in some cases traditional methods of proof taking and
testing may militate against receipt of the best evidence potentially
available’ (2001: 7). The existence of CCTV testimony acknowledges
that the circumstances of the live trial can be traumatic to the extent
of being counter-productive for some trial participants. Yet the term
‘vulnerable witness’ demonstrates. Yet the term ‘vulnerable witness’
demonstrates that legal practitioners and scholars frame this resultant
potential trauma as a shortcoming of the witness, not the trial process
itself. A trial participant’s weakness or ‘vulnerability’ makes him or
her unsuited to the trial process. As such, they are the exception to
the norm, and CCTV testimony is a special means to enable people
to testify who may otherwise withdraw his/her complaint. However
by defining these witnesses as ‘exceptional’, what is involved in what
Ellison termed ‘traditional methods of proof-testing’—and what I
argue can be understood as the centrality of live performance—escapes
scrutiny. So why is CCTV testimony only permissible in exceptional
circumstances? Or, to reconfigure the question in the context of this
paper, what is the value of the live performance in the trial?
Up until the 20th century, the necessity of a live or open trial was
ostensibly so that witnesses, jury and judges could see and be seen,
hear and be heard. This fulfils the prescription in Magna Carta that an
accused has the right to face his or her accuser: more generally known
as the principle of ‘confrontation’. A more recent attempt to summarise
what is at the core of traditional evidence testing is outlined by Jeremy
Gans and Andrew Palmer (2004) in Australian Principles of Evidence:
This preference for oral testimony ... is probably based upon some or
all of the following (questionable) beliefs:
A person is more likely to tell the truth if he or she testifies on oath,
and subject to the threat of prosecution for perjury proceedings;
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Any falsehoods or inaccuracies in a person’s account are more likely
to be exposed if the person is subjected to cross-examination; and
The tribunal of fact will be better placed to decide whether or not the
person is telling the truth if the person is in court so that his or her
demeanour can be assessed (2004: 47).

Arguably, CCTV testimony offers a previously unforeseen
alternative that meets all of the above criteria: a witness can see and be
seen (albeit within a limited fashion as I shall detail later), hear and be
heard immediately without being physically present in the courtroom.
The witness is still under oath and must still account for his or her
evidence. He or she must be in a designated place at a specific time.
All that differs is the absence of his or her body from the courtroom,
and the fact that he or she is no longer sharing the same space with the
other trial participants. So how much is the live trial to do with bodies
sharing the same space at the same time? What is this ‘intangible’ but
‘critical’ atmosphere of the trial?

The Value of Live Presence
To explore these questions about the ‘power’ of live performance, I
will draw on the work of performance theorist Philip Auslander (1987,
1996). Auslander interrogates the symbolic value of live performance in
his book, Liveness (1996), in which a chapter is devoted to the criminal
jury trial. He argues that the trial has proved particularly resistant to
the introduction of mediatisation (such as closed-circuit television
testimony) and claims that criminal trial procedure is ‘rooted in an
unexamined belief that live confrontation can somehow give rise to
the truth in ways that recorded representations cannot’ (1996: 128).
Auslander questions the dichotomy between the live and the
mediatised, claiming that this is an artificial (and unsustainable)
construct, usually adopted by performance practitioners and theorists
to valorise the ‘purity’ of the live through the concept of ‘presence’,
and thereby to shore up theatre‘s value and viability in the face of
film, television and new media (Auslander 1996, 1987). This notion
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of presence is expanded on in both Liveness and an article, ‘Towards a
Concept of the Political in Postmodern Theatre’ (1987).
Auslander seeks to demythologise essentialist definitions of live
performance, which credit it as having greater authenticity than
mediatised forms of cultural production. He points out that live
presence has no quantifiable ‘real’ value; rather this value is only
recognised in opposition to mediatised forms. This is supported by the
fact that legal argument about the value of live presence in the trial only
becomes a subject of debate in the face of its potential replacement: in
this case, CCTV testimony, which has led to the articulation of beliefs
about the link between live presence and truth telling.

In the next section, I examine legal arguments for the importance of
live presence in the trial in response to CCTV testimony. Because this
does not necessarily interfere with the ‘open’ trial (because all witnesses
can see and be seen, hear and be heard), the contemporary justifications
for the value of live presence usually involve ‘confrontation’ and
‘demeanour assessment’. Examining these concepts, I will interrogate
how they point to embodied performance’s central role in the trial. I
will also show how this very centrality of performance facilitates the
routine use of coercion and pressure involved in traditional means of
evidence testing.

Positive Intimidation: Confrontation
The principle or ‘right’ of confrontation is a well-established feature of
common law. Derived from a clause in the Magna Carta, confrontation
outlines the right of the defendant to be confronted with and to test
the witnesses against him or her in open court. In the US, the right to
‘confrontation’ is explicitly outlined in the Sixth Amendment of the
US Constitution. But does ‘confrontation’ explicitly mean face-to-face
confrontation?

This question, and the related question of whether CCTV testimony
therefore contravenes the principle of confrontation, was first tested
in the US Supreme Court in the case of Maryland v Craig (1990).6
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Although the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favour of CCTV
testimony usage for vulnerable witnesses, the judges also made explicit
that they believed that the ‘Confrontation Clause’ meant face-to-face
confrontation and, therefore, CCTV testimony could only act as a
substitute in exceptional cases involving vulnerable witnesses. Although
CCTV testimony was permissible, it was certainly not preferable. The
Supreme Court judges argued that the ‘ideal’ trial involved direct
confrontation despite the drafters of the Sixth Amendment not being
able to foresee such technological developments as remote but ‘live’
testimony.

A dissenting judge in the case, Justice Antonin Scalia, took
this further and argued that the value of face to face testimony was
so important that CCTV testimony was unacceptable and always
contravened a defendant’s right to a fair trial: ‘[it is wrong because]
the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it
guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable
evidence, undeniably among which was ‘face-to-face’ confrontation’
(Maryland v Craig 1990). For Scalia, when a witness is present, this does
not mean that he or she will necessarily tell the truth, but rather that
all the circumstances to ensure the best possible evidence are upheld.

Eilis Magner, an Australian legal academic specialising in Evidence
Law, refines this idea further when she notes that effective crossexamination, in whatever guise is deemed suitable, is seen as the key
to a fair trial (Magner 1995: 94). This is reflected in the hearsay rule,
whereby lack of opportunity for cross-examination of testimony will
usually lead to exclusion of this evidence from trial.7 The fair trial
therefore comes down to the importance of live cross-examination.
This tells us that the spontaneity of a witness’s immediate response, and
a privileging of the immediate evidence, is considered a more reliable
indicator of the truth than, for example, a written statement. Louise
Ellison comments:
A deep-seated belief that oral evidence is invariably best is also rooted
in basic assumptions of adversarial theory regarding the optimal
testing of informational sources. Great faith is specifically placed in
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the capacity of cross-examination to expose the dishonest, mistaken,
or unreliable witness, and to uncover inconsistency and inaccuracy
(Ellison 2001: 11).

However, inextricably bound up with ‘confrontation’ is the
controversial question of intimidation. In 2000, the NSW Attorney
General’s Office released the report, People with an Intellectual
Disability and the Criminal Justice System. While technically dealing
with vulnerable witnesses, the report affirms that legal agents openly
acknowledge that the courtroom is always a place of potential stress for
a witness to some extent, and that this is a necessary part of the process
and is only deemed problematic if the witness is ‘unduly’ intimidated
(2000: 7.20). That is, general intimidation of a witness is regarded as
an aid to the truth-telling mechanisms of the adversarial criminal trial.
This ‘positive’ intimidation is also the primary means of evidencetesting. Cross-examination is specifically designed to challenge and
discomfort a witness. When a witness undergoes cross-examination
successfully (that is, when they maintain their credibility and do not
make any telling admissions that would point to whether or not they
are telling the truth), it is more likely that he or she will be believed.8
Legal practitioners believe that some degree of intimidation will
have a positive effect on reliability and function as a safeguard of
truth-telling:
Some prosecutors say that a child’s evidence will be seen by a jury as
less credible if not adduced in the traditional manner. In addition,
some prosecutors are said to believe that the appearance of a visibly
distressed child witness makes a jury more likely to convict (ALRC
1992: 14.105).

Visible distress can be regarded, it seems, as a marker of credibility.9
Legal scholarship therefore clearly identifies the value of live presence
as being synonymous with confrontation and ‘positive’ intimidation.
Yet, ultimately, it is a jury’s assessment of a witness’s credibility that is
of more consequence than any theoretical discussion about a witness’s
honesty. This leads us to the next justification for the value of live
presence: demeanour assessment.
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Reading the Body: Demeanour Assessment
Demeanour assessment is where the jury assesses the credibility of a
witness through his/her appearance and manner as well as the content
of his/her testimony. Although essential for juries making a decision,
demeanour assessment is a highly controversial part of trial practice,
with many legal practitioners and scholars including senior judges (in
Australia at least) arguing that it is obsolete. For example, Underwood
(2001) argues that, ‘the idea that it is possible to sift the accurate oral
account from the inaccurate oral account from the demeanour of the
witness has long been discredited’ (2001: 167; see also Kirby 2000).
Nevertheless, in Australia currently, an appeal cannot be mounted
in a higher court to dispute a finding as to a witness’s credibility that is
based on the demeanour assessment of a lower court judge. ‘[W]here
a case is decided upon a trial judge’s findings based on assessment of a
witness’s credit or demeanour, the Appellate Court will not intervene.
Not seeing the witness is said to ‘put[s] the Appellate judges in a position
of permanent disadvantage’ (Porter 2001: 45).10 Unless judges are in the
room with the witness at the time, they are unable to make decisions
based on credibility. This contradicts both Underwood’s and Kirby’s
assertion that demeanour assessment has been long discredited.

The near impossibility of capturing such ‘nuances’ in the written
transcripts of court proceedings bears out performance theorist’s Peggy
Phelan‘s claim that live performance is an event that ‘disappears into
memory, into the realm of invisibility where it eludes regulation and
control’ and is predicated the fundamental qualities of disappearance and
unrepeatability (Phelan and Lane 1998: 8). The continued recognition of
the role of demeanour assessment demonstrates, as Auslander asserted,
that the law is an ontologically live practice (1996: 158), but valorisation of
the live event does not explain why the live is privileged as more likely to
access truth in this day and age. Can juries really assess whether someone
is telling the truth through their demeanour on the stand? For a juror to
believe this requires him or her to believe that there are certain relatively
fixed signs that indicate honesty or dishonesty. This disregards the cultural
context within which the signs of a ‘performance’ are interpreted.
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Research Findings
The concern that mediatised testimony will be considered less
‘authentic’ by a jury is expressed in Taylor and Joudo’s (2005) study
which specifically targets legal practitioners. Taylor and Joudo found
that legal practitioners worried whether remote testimony would dilute
the impact of testimony on the jury. Undoubtedly part of the reason
for this ambivalence is tradition. By linking the live trial with truthtelling, legal practitioners do not necessarily believe that the current
trial process is flawless; however, it is a time-tested method which
legal agents are (unsurprisingly) reluctant to alter unnecessarily. Yet
the misgivings of legal practitioners with regard to CCTV testimony is
to some extent supported by investigation into juror reception. Orcutt
et al (2001), Eaton et al (2001) and Landstrom (2008) all returned
findings in their studies showing that where jurors were asked to rate the
credibility of a witness before them versus a witness testifying remotely,
they uniformly found a witness’s credibility to be reduced through the
usage of CCTV testimony. The Orcutt study specifically noted that:
In summary, children testifying via CCTV were seen as less accurate,
less honest, and less attractive than children who testified in open
court, and jurors were less likely to convict the defendant when the
child testified via CCTV. Jurors did not report feeling significantly less
empathy for the defendant or the child. Thus, testimony via CCTV
appeared to result in a more negative view of child witnesses as well
as a small but significant decrease in the likelihood of conviction’
(2001: 342).

One potential problem is the quality of the live feed itself. In
1994, the Australian Law Reform Commission drew attention to the
potential problem of distortion of visual images, through an inability
of the triers of fact (whether judge or jury) to assess the scale of the
image, or through the inability for a trier of fact to see the remote
room in its entirety. In the case of child witnesses, because it is often
the case that their evidence-in-chief is allowed in video form, the
jury and court may never see the witness in person. The report notes:
‘CCTV may not permit the jury to see the size of the child and so it
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may leave the jury unaware of the vulnerability of the child as against
the accused’ (ALRC 1994).
If CCTV testimony ideally simulates, as best as possible, the
experience of live evidence testing, it is fundamental that the quality
of the recording and the circumstances in which it is recorded are also
optimised. As David Tait’s Justice Research group points out, the quality
of the screen in the courtroom, its size, and a host of other small details
are incredibly important in how a juror will interpret a witness, and how
a witness may judge his/her experience of testifying. 11 However, along
with potential technological defects, there is the question as to whether
the presence of cameras alters witnesses’ behaviour or alters jurors’
assessment of their behaviour, which is also linked to the potential for
the technology to ‘theatricalise’ the proceedings.

This potential alteration in a witness’s behaviour can happen in two
ways. Firstly, there is the claim that both the physical presence and use
of technology will directly affect and distort the behaviour of those in
the court causing the witness to ‘act up‘, and rendering them less likely
to be truthful or ‘natural’. While this comment was about another form
of mediatisation — the broadcasting of proceedings — the potential for
‘acting up’ is posited not only on the witness performing to the imagined
audience, but also in relation to the immediate physical stress caused by
the presence of cameras and/or the disruptive effects of screens in the
courtroom.12 Although cameras, according to some critics, may function
as a behavioural trigger, the perceived risk that trial participants will
‘act-up’ presupposes that traditional methods of live evidence allow trial
participants to be relatively ‘natural’. This would contradict the concept
of ‘positive intimidation’ referred to earlier in this paper and implies
a lack of recognition of the particular kind of performance that takes
place in the courtroom. As we have seen, attempts to assess what is
problematic about CCTV testimony fail to also query what might be
problematic about live testimony. Just as the value of live performance
cannot be measured and definitively ‘proven’, studies to assess CCTV
testimony’s effects cannot clearly distinguish which are particular to
CCTV testimony, and which may be more general reactions to any
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form of cross-examination. As Orcutt et al observed:
[T]he reliable cues discriminating liars from truthtellers are
uncontrollable signs of arousal ... and are not signs of lying per se Cues
revealing fear and arousal can be useful in situations where a person
should not show fear if he or she is being truthful. In a courtroom,
however, a witness afraid of not being believed or a witness afraid of
con- fronting an abuser may display a number of the same behaviours
as a liar afraid of being caught (Orcutt et al 2001: 342).

This makes interpreting any findings difficult. Take for example
David Tait’s Justice Research Group’s Gateways to Justice study in
2009:
… making (simulated) eye contact is valued highly both by the
interviewer and the witness ... Conversely not making eye contact —
resulting from the cameras being in the wrong position in the standard
remote witness room — seemed to increase stress for the participants
and made it harder to develop a rapport (2009: [4]).

Does this mean that more effective simulation of CCTV testimony
will be able to provide this rapport or does the very need to simulate
it mean that ‘there continue[s] to be something special about physical
proximity which should encourage us to maintain face-to-face contact
for non-exceptional witnesses whatever alternatives technology offers
us?’ (Mulcahy 2008: 483).
I believe that what makes this question impossible to answer is
that it , like most studies and most scholarship, overlooks the crucial
importance of belief in the value of live testimony. In other words, it
is not possible to answer Mulcahy’s question posed above because it is
not clear from any available study whether witnesses or jurors believe
confrontation does make witnesses more truthful, or whether they are
simply more likely to be believed because the jury thinks confrontation
makes witnesses more truthful (a kind of circularity of belief). If jurors
believe confrontation is useful or necessary to ascertaining a higher
likelihood of truth-telling, they are less likely to doubt the veracity of
a witness who testifies in person during such a study. This means that
jurors will only confirm their own beliefs, rather than ‘prove’ the link
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between liveness and truth-telling.

This is also, arguably, what Auslander does not account for
sufficiently. By concentrating on whether there is a ‘real’ distinction
between the live and the mediatised, he does not adequately address
the role belief plays in maintaining this distinction. The difference
between what is ‘real’ and what is believed to be ‘real’ is arguably not
that important. Collective belief in the value of live performance is
authentic in the sense that it becomes self-fulfilling. Consequently,
when Auslander asserts that the trial‘s emphasis on the live is
‘unexamined’, he fails to account for the fact that live confrontation in
the criminal jury trial has a symbolic (and real) value because we invest
in the belief that it does. The transience of Performance Studies‘ object
of study — what Peggy Phelan identified as the disappearance of live
performance — can be overcome to some extent by recognising the
value of the belief itself. That is, it is not about proving whether the
live is magical, special or, in the above case, inherently more likely to
facilitate the truth. What matters are the real effects of the collective
belief that it will. in it has. So what are the real effects with regard to
the usage of CCTV testimony?

One of the only things about which we may be relatively certain
regarding CCTV testimony is that its usage (using real children‘s
testimony rather than mock trials) resulted in vastly improved outcomes
for the testifier — the child witness was much more able to cope with his
or her surroundings, retain information and respond to questioning.13
Witnesses felt less pressured without physical confrontation — either
in terms of being in the court, in front of their accuser, or in front of
an advocate cross-examining them. CCTV testimony usage can allow
child witnesses, and others classed as ‘vulnerable‘, to feel they are
more able to come forward and testify, and this is explicitly why such
technology was developed.
Yet as Stephen Odgers, President of the NSW Bar Council,
observed when commenting on the automatic provision for CCTV
outlined in a 2003 amendment:
Some Crown prosecutors would prefer it if complainants testify, partly
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because they might be concerned that a jury will draw an adverse
comparison with an accused who does go in the witness box in front of
them and testifies, and partly because I think they think that you’ll get
more empathy with a complainant who’s actually in front of the jury,
who they can see clearly, and assess their body language, particularly
in response to cross examination (Odgers 2005).

Minimisation of confrontation is a double-edged sword. The
lessening of trauma sustained by the witness is offset by the possibility
that jurors are less likely to believe her if she is not present in the
courtroom when testifying. This risks harming the complainant‘s
chances of securing a conviction. As long as jurors and legal
practitioners believe the ideal means to obtain the best evidence is ‘live’,
minimising the burden of live performance via CCTV testimony risks
harming a witness’s credibility.

Conclusion
While this paper has had a relatively narrow focus — that of CCTV
testimony — in conclusion I would like to consider the role of CCTV
testimony as part of a larger project of trial reform for ‘vulnerable
witnesses’. In NSW, significant reform addressing one category of
vulnerable witnesses, sexual assault complainants, has resulted in
an influx of new legislation. In response, in 2006 the NSW Bar
Association held a meeting to educate barristers about the changes in
sexual assault law. On arriving, each barrister received a thick booklet
canvassing all the major reforms, which included provision for CCTV
testimony, limitations on appropriate questioning, making sexual
assault trials closed to the public, readmission of previous trial testimony
via affidavit, and allowing a complainant a support person while they
testified. After going through the amendments, a voice called out from
the back of the room: ‘Why bother having a trial?’
The barrister‘s question — why bother having a trial? — voices, in
very blunt terms, the crux of the problem when it comes to technology
and reform. This is not a matter of a lack of political will to change the
law — law reform is not only possible in NSW, it has also occurred
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relatively frequently in recent times. For example, since 2003 there
have been multiple changes to the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)
and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). These amendments include the
automatic use of CCTV testimony for children and for sexual assault
complainants. However, these reforms downplay the confrontational
characteristics of the trial and, in so doing, seek to alter long-standing
means of evidence-testing that are central to legal and popular belief
as to the optimum means to obtain a just outcome.

While we belief that the live presence of witnesses aids credibility,
we risk impairing the credibility of witnesses testifying remotely.
Debates about CCTV testimony and authenticity expose the centrality
of ‘liveness’ to the trial, as well as the concomitant problems that
associations between authenticity and this liveness may carry with
it. The term ‘vulnerable witnesses’, therefore, becomes problematic
as questions are posed that are broader than simply how to deal with
a small and ‘exceptional’ group of witnesses.14 Instead of treating
vulnerable witness’s trial experiences as exceptional, effective reform
needs to address the entrenched association between liveness,
confrontation and truth-telling. Ultimately, the undervaluing of the
importance of live performance to the trial potentially impedes effective
technological reform. As Linda Mulcahy elegantly expresses it:
[P]erhaps the dynamics of the adversarial trial are such that rather
than creating special categories of witness deserving of attention,
we should awaken to the fact that most witnesses could be labelled
vulnerable (2008: 489).

Notes
1

While the complexity of the spatial dynamics and sociological implications
of the courtroom are also of considerable importance, it is beyond the scope
of this paper to attend to them in more detail. I have elsewhere published
a detailed account of the sociological implications of the courtroom space
drawing upon the work of Foucault and Bourdieu. I argue that ‘presence’
in the courtroom necessarily involves participation in a highly complex
performative space involving significant degrees of coercion. Please see

328

CCTV: Liveness and Truth-telling

2

3

4

5

6

Leader (2007). Other important works are Mohr (1999) and Radul (2007),
of which the latter specifically discusses the impact of mediatisation on
the architecture of the courtroom.

‘The process of a modern trial is not something that has been designed,
or recently redesigned, to achieve the best result for parties in dispute.
Rather, its adversarial nature and characteristics of continuity and orality
have arisen from an historic scenario that, by and large, no longer exists.
Yet, as I have observed, curiously, this process is seldom questioned’ (2006:
166).
In criminal proceedings ‘the court is not to find the case of the prosecution
proved unless it is satisfied that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt’,
whereas in civil cases ‘the court must find the case of a party proved if it is
satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities’. In
civil cases, the prosecution case succeeds if it is proved on the balance of
probabilities. Inversely, in criminal trials, a defendant’s case succeeds (eg
they are acquitted) if their case is proved on the balance of probabilities
(Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ss 140, 141).
‘[b]ecause liberty and reputation are at stake, it is accepted that the law
should be tender to the rights of the accused, and be more ready to risk the
acquittal of the guilty than the conviction of the innocent. A well-known
example is the higher standard of proof demanded in criminal cases’ (NSW
LRC 1978, Chapter 6).
As evidence law expert Eilis Magner comments: ‘the presumption that
evidence given in a common law trial should be offered in oral form is
enshrined in the common law’ (1995: 70).

In this case, the defendant had been found guilty of child sexual assault
at his initial trial. The complainant had given testimony through one-way
CCTV transmission where the court could see the complainant, but she
could not see them. This was because, her counsel argued, the complainant
was a vulnerable witness. The defendant’s conviction was then overturned
by the Maryland Appeal Court who argued that his right to face-to-face
confrontation had been violated. The Supreme Court judges, however,
reinstated the defendant’s conviction, confirming CCTV testimony as
acceptable in the exceptional circumstances of a vulnerable witness.
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7

8

9

Louise Ellison (2001) notes the close relation of the preference for
confrontation and the Hearsay rule. The Hearsay rule is the requirement
that any evidence must be sufficiently tested before being deemed
admissible in court. Consequently, statements made that cannot be
sufficiently tested — such as second-hand reports of what someone may
have said — are excluded under its provisions.
In the United Kingdom in 2005 Roberts et al posed the question: ‘if special
measures are an unmitigated ‘good thing’ with no undesirable side effects,
why stop at especially vulnerable or intimated witnesses as meritorious
candidates for assistance? After all, few people positively relish the prospect
of searching forensic examination in the witness box, and those who have
sampled the experience self-report alarmingly high levels of anxiety, fear
and feelings of intimidation’ (Roberts 2005: 269 n 19).

This is supported by Justice Scalia’s comments in Maryland v Craig:
‘ Unwillingness cannot be a valid excuse under the Confrontation Clause,
whose very object is to place the witness under the sometimes hostile glare
of the defendant. That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the
truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound
and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent
adult’ (Maryland v Craig 1990).

10 This is reflected in the findings of a New Zealand Law Commission Report:
‘the demeanour displayed by witnesses and the manner in which they
present their testimony are traditionally regarded as relevant to assessing
truthfulness. This has contributed to the reluctance of appellate courts to
interfere with first instance findings of fact based on a determination of
truthfulness. However, a determination of truthfulness by reference to
demeanour has a subjective basis which will inevitably reflect the values,
experience and cultural norms of the fact-finder’ (1997: 38).

11 As Mulcahy has noted, a major flaw in the development of CCTV
testimony has been that ‘[CCTV testimony] facility provisions appear
to pay little heed to the goal of rendering live link [CCTV testimony] as
close as possible to live performance within the courtroom’ (2008: 480).
12 As far back as 1937, the introduction of press photography was thought
to potentially impair the seriousness of the proceedings: ‘Proceedings in
court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking
of photographs in the courtroom during sessions of the court or recesses
between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated
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to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court
and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public
and should not be permitted’ (ABA 1937: Canon 35). See also Frank
(1987).

13 See Orcutt (2008), Taylor and Joudo (2005), Cashmore and Trimboli
(2006) amongst others.

14 As Linda Mulcahy observes, it could be argued ‘The move towards
separation of vulnerable witnesses from the rest of the court in the criminal
justice system represents nothing more than a pragmatic solution to a
discrete problem when there is in fact a systemic failing in the adjudicatory
model employed’ (2008: 489). Indeed, the category of ‘vulnerable witness’
is ever-expanding, encompassing domestic abuse complainants, sexual
assault complainants, and potentially also those with learning or language
difficulties, physical disabilities and those who are non-native English
speakers.
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